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This paper analyzes effects of transaction costs on household responses, adding to direct effects via price-bands,
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household decisions by claiming productive resources, and by affecting endogenous prices at household or micro-
economy level. Comparison of two stylized village model specifications indicates that indirect effects of transaction
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transactions, and in terms of tradability of these commodities, to account for indirect effects of transaction costs.
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Endogenous Transaction Costs and Tradability in a Micro Economywide
Model – a Stylized Application With Nonseparable Households
Marijke H. Kuiper
1
Transaction costs play an important role in understanding policy response of rural households in
developing countries. High transaction costs, for example due to poorly developed
infrastructure, inhibit market access and can create interdependence between production and
consumption decisions of rural households. Such nonseparability of consumption and
production decisions can result in small or even counterintuitive policy response, like a reduction
in marketed surplus in response to a price increase (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet). Limited
market access not only creates interdependencies within households, but also between
households within a rural community. Lack of access to external markets, combined with
heterogeneity between households, can result in local markets with endogenous prices and
expenditure linkages (Holden, Taylor and Hampton). Counterintuitive policy responses then
arise, if indirect effects (from interactions between households) outweigh direct effects (as
predicted with (nonseparable) household models). General equilibrium models recently have
been applied at the micro level to account for such interactions between households in villages
(Taylor, Yunez-Naude and Hampton), or between villages and towns (Taylor, Yunez-Naude and
Dyer).
This paper develops a micro economywide model in which nonseparable household
models are embedded. Trading of commodities
2 outside the own community is subject to
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transaction costs, consisting of labor and capital needed to transport commodities. These
transaction costs create a price-band between selling and purchasing prices. The prevailing trade
regime, i.e. whether a household is a net seller, self-sufficient, or a net buyer, is determined
endogenously, depending on the value of household shadow prices with respect to effective
buying and selling prices.
This paper extends the existing literature by including the effect of transaction costs on the
availability of productive resources and price formation. The limited number of existing studies
looking at the impact of transaction costs on the trade regime, only account for the impact of
transaction costs on prices paid and received by the household. This approach implicitly assumes
that transaction costs consist of something purchased on a market, and that purchases for
transactions do not affect prices. This assumption is not valid if transaction costs consist of
commodities with limited tradability. Use of commodities for transactions will then affect price
formation and availability of commodities for other activities.
To explore the impact of different assumptions on the impact of transaction costs on
household response, applied models are developed based on a stylized village social accounting
matrix (SAM). This SAM is constructed such as to reflect typical circumstances in an isolated
village in a developing country, but simplified to the essentials needed to highlight the structure
of the model.
Transaction costs are assumed to exist of a household nontradable (labor), and a village
nontradable (capital). Poor infrastructure in developing countries leads to relative large amounts
of time spent travelling to and from markets, thus composing an important part of the
transaction costs incurred by households. Given frequent labor market imperfections in
developing countries, time spent on travelling may be at the expense of time spent on
production activities. Labor is assumed to be a household nontradable to simplify the analysis.
As a result price-bands are household-specific. To study the impact of a commodity that is3
tradable at household level but has an endogenous village price, capital goods are assumed to be
a second input for transactions.
Household response to increasing cash-crop prices is explored with two village model
specifications: (a) transaction costs affecting price-bands and commodity balances (b) transaction
costs affecting price-bands only. The second model resembles existing models looking at the
impact of transaction costs on trade regimes. Comparison of the model results shows the
indirect effects of transaction costs.
Transaction Costs in Price-bands and Commodity Balances of Households
Nonseparable household models play an important role in understanding policy response of
rural households in developing countries. The seminal work of de Janvry, Fafchamps and
Sadoulet  shows how rational behavior of farmers in combination with market failures may give
rise to sluggish or counterintuitive household responses. Nonseparability of household
production and consumption decisions occurs when the effective price of a commodity used
both in production and consumption is not exogenous to the household, but is determined
endogenously by household demand and supply. In this case decisions at the production side will
affect demand and supply of the commodity, which affects consumption decisions, and vice
versa. Such nonseparability occurs if households are not price-takers in a market, if markets are
missing, or if there is a gap between buying and selling prices (Löfgren and Robinson).
Both missing markets and differences between buying and selling prices can be analyzed
with a price-band model, illustrated in figure 1. Starting from an exogenous market price,
transaction costs increase the effective purchase price, and decrease the effective sale price faced
by the household. Household demand and supply then determine the household shadow price of
the commodity, with effective purchase and sale prices forming upper and lower boundaries.
Depending on the intersection of the demand and supply curve, the household is (1) a net buyer,4
(2) self-sufficient, (3) a net seller of the commodity. If the household is a net buyer or seller, the
household shadow price equals the effective purchase or sale price. If the household is self-
sufficient, the household shadow price is endogenously determined within the price-band. A
missing market can be conceptualized in this model as a wide price-band (in the most extreme
case a sale price of zero and an infinite purchase price), such that the household always operates
within it.
[insert figure 1: price-band]
Household response then consists of two decisions, (i) a discrete decision on their position
in the market (determining their position as net buyer, net seller or not participating), and (ii) a
continuous decision on production and consumption levels (determining their supply response).
Most studies using the price-band model take the first decision, the position of the household in
the market, as exogenous, focussing on the implications of this position on household response.
A limited number of studies explicitly account for factors affecting the width of the price-band
and the resulting market participation decision of the household. Goetz and Key, Sadoulet and
de Janvry estimate the impact of different factors on the market participation decisions with a
household model. Löfgren and Robinson embed nonseparable household models in a CGE
model, in which the market-position of households is endogenous.
These three studies include the impact of transaction costs through price-bands only,
implicitly assuming that transaction costs consist of something purchased on a market, and that
purchase of commodities for transactions does not affect price formation. If commodities are
purchased on a market, purchases are limited by the cash constraint. Inclusion of purchased
commodities in the commodity balance does not affected household decision making, as long as
purchases do not affect market prices. Additional purchases can then be made at an exogenous
price, as long as sufficient cash is available. Purchased transaction commodities can thus be
omitted from the commodity balance without affecting household decision making, if their price5
is exogenous. By accounting for the impact of transaction costs on effective household prices,
transaction costs are indirectly included in the cash constraint. For example, using the effective
price for selling output (the market price reduced with transaction costs), reduces the amount of
cash available to the household. The difference between value of output at market prices and the
value at effective household prices are the transaction costs of selling the output, thus indirectly
including transaction costs in the cash constraint.
Including transaction cost only in the price-band is no longer valid if prices of
commodities are determined endogenously, like in the model by Löfgren and Robinson. Limited
tradability (at household or economy level) results in endogenous commodity prices. Although
households may continue to perceive prices as exogenous, market-clearing prices are influenced
by household supply and demand, including the demand for transaction commodities. To
account for the impact of transaction costs on overall demand, and thus on prices, commodities
used for transactions need to be included in the commodity balance.
In addition to affecting endogenous prices, the use of commodities as transaction inputs
may also affect production decisions, by reducing the amount of resources available for
production. Defining transaction costs as comprising costs of information, search, negotiation,
screening, monitoring, coordination, enforcement and transportation (Sadoulet and de Janvry),
transaction costs are likely to affect the resources available for production. For example,
transportation in most developing countries requires a lot of time, due to poor infrastructure.
With imperfect labor markets, this time spend on transportation may be at the expense of other
productive activities. Even if time spend on transportation may be reduced by a transport service
sector, search, negotiation and screening still require family time.
The household model used in this paper accounts for the impact of transaction costs on
the effective prices faced by the household through price-bands, on endogenous prices, and on
the availability of resources for production. A standard household model is used in which6
households maximize utility subject to a production function, a commodity balance and a cash
constraint (see for example Singh, Squire and Strauss). Since the focus of this paper is on
comparing the impact of different assumptions on transaction costs, the model is kept as simple
as possible. Cobb-Douglas utility and CES production functions are assumed, allowing
calibration of the model with the stylized SAM, and substitution-elasticity parameters for the
production functions. To allow switches in trade regimes, the model is written as a mixed
complementarity problem, by explicitly incorporating nonnegativity constraints on purchased
and sold quantities (Rutherford). Manipulation of the first-order-conditions of this optimization
problem results in the household model presented in the first part of table 1.
[insert table 1: model description]
Price equations form the first part of the household model. The first equation defines cost-
pricing of output: households are assumed to be price-takers in a competitive environment with
a constant returns-to-scale technology. Household-specific input-output coefficients (α hio)
provide the amount of input per unit of output; multiplication with the input price and summing
over all inputs determines output price. The complementarity constraint allows the household to
stop producing if input costs exceed output price.
Price equations (2) and (3) determine the price of traded commodities. Selling and
purchasing prices are distinguished to allow introduction of price-bands in the model. If a
commodity is purchased, the first part of equation (2) holds as an equality, i.e. the household
shadow price (
p
hj p ~ ) is equal to the market price (
p
j p ) plus transaction costs. If a commodity is
sold, the first part of equation (3) holds as an equality, i.e. the household shadow price is equal to
the market price minus transaction costs. If a commodity is produced for own consumption
only, quantities purchased and sold are equal to zero, implying that the household shadow price
lies between the purchasing (upper limit) and selling prices (lower limit) defined by (2) and (3).7
The trading regime for each household is thus determined endogenously, depending on market
prices and transaction costs (Löfgren and Robinson).
Household nontradability is defined implicitly by not including commodities in the set of
purchased (P) or sold commodities (S). Their prices are not bounded by outside prices, and thus
determined endogenously on the basis of supply and demand within the household.
Effective prices of household tradables are determined by the market price (exogenous to
the household) and transaction costs. Transaction costs are defined by a (fixed) transaction
coefficient, specifying the amount of inputs required per unit of traded commodity (τ hjt). This
transaction coefficient may differ for purchasing and selling, and it may differ among
commodities and among households. Together with prices of inputs used in transactions,
transaction coefficients determine the difference between market prices and effective prices
faced by the household.
Multiplying transaction coefficients with quantities purchased and sold yields the total
amount of inputs used for transactions, 
t
hj q , in (8). By including these quantities in the
commodity balance (9) the model accounts for the impact of transaction costs on the availability
of production factors for production and consumption (leisure) in case of household
nontradables, and on the price formation for commodities traded in local markets (see next
section).
A constant-returns-to-scale production technology is assumed, output levels thus can not
be determined in isolation of demand. However, per-unit input coefficients can still be
determined, using the first-order-condition of cost minimization for a single unit of output
(Ginsburgh and Keyzer, p. 130). These (price-dependent) input-output coefficients are calculated
in (4), implicitly defining the production technology. The input-output coefficients determine the
total demand for inputs for each household (5), as well as the output price of each commodity
(1). The Cobb-Douglas utility function results in fixed expenditure shares (6). Cost pricing8
implies that households obtain income (7) from their factor endowments, and possible
exogenous sources of income.
In summary, the innovative aspects of the household model presented in table 1, are the
household-specific price-bands defined in (2) and (3), and the impact of transactions costs on the
availability of productive resources (9). Furthermore, by including transaction inputs in the
commodity balance, their impact on market-clearing prices is accounted for as discussed below.
Nonseparable Decisions in a Micro Economywide Model: Two Models
Factors causing nonseparability of household decisions are also likely to create interdependencies
between heterogeneous households in a rural community. Poorly developed infrastructure may
hamper trade with the rest of the world, but still allow trade within a community. If households
differ enough in resource endowments, production systems or preferences to allow trade, local
markets with endogenous prices and expenditure linkages will exist. Through these local linkages
changes initially affecting only a single type of household, may influence the whole community
by changing demand and supply of locally traded commodities.
To allow for such local interactions the household models are embedded in a village-level
general equilibrium (economywide) model. Following the approach of Taylor and Adelman
village level trade balances are added to the household models discussed above (see lower part of
table 1). For commodities that are household tradables but village nontradables, the trade
balance determines a local market-clearing price (10). The model assumes that households are
price-takers in these local markets: for households prices of locally traded commodities are
exogenous, while for village as a whole these prices are endogenous.
The trade balance of village tradables (11) calculates total amounts imported by and
exported from the village: the total amount sold by the households is exported from the village,
and the total amount purchased is imported in the village. For these commodities the market9
price is fixed outside the village. The model does not require the equivalent of a balance-of-
payments constraint: all households satisfy their budget constraint, which in combination with
the trade balance satisfies the balance of payments for the village as a whole.
If commodities used for transactions are household tradables but village nontradables,
changes in traded volume will affect prices of transaction inputs. The transaction inputs are
included in the commodity balance and thus incorporated in the demand and supply determining
the village market equilibrium (10). Changes in demand for transaction inputs will thus affect
local prices, determined by the Lagrange multiplier of (10).
Equation (1) - (11) constitute a micro economywide model with endogenous trade regimes
and transaction costs. Main differences with the model developed in Löfgren and Robinson  are
the household-specific endogenous transaction costs, and the inclusion of transaction inputs in
the commodity balance, thus including the impact of changes in traded volume on endogenous
prices of transaction inputs and on availability of resources for other activities.
To explore the implications of different assumptions on transaction costs two versions of
the model presented in table 1 are developed. Model A assumes that part of the transaction
inputs (labor) are a household nontradable, while part of the transaction costs (capital) are locally
tradable. Transaction costs are incorporated in the commodity balances of the households. For
the household nontradable labor, this accounts for the impact of using labor for transactions on
availability of labor for other uses. For capital, a village nontradable, inclusion in the commodity
balance accounts for the impact of traded volumes on the endogenous village price of capital.
Model B ignores the impact of transaction costs on availability of production factors and
on price formation by only including transaction inputs in the price equations. This amounts to
eliminating equation (8) from the model presented in table 1. Model B resembles the approach
used in other studies of transaction costs and market participation decisions. Comparison of the10
stylized versions of Model A and Model B, that are identical in all other respects, shows the
impact of accounting for the indirect effects of transaction costs on household responses.
A Stylized Village Economy
Table 2 presents a stylized village SAM, constructed to reflect typical circumstances in an isolated
village in a developing country, but kept as simple as possible. The SAM has to households, four
household-specific activities, five commodities and three production factors. Despite an isolated
location (in terms of travelling time to nearby towns and markets), the village has links with the
outside world through selling of cash crops, purchasing of external inputs for production, and
purchasing of manufactured goods for consumption.
[insert table 2 SAM]
Two types of households are distinguished to reflect the importance of non-agrarian
incomes in rural communities. Some members of the migration household are assumed to have
migrated to urban areas in search for better employment opportunities. This is reflected by
receipts of remittances, and a higher land/labor ratio than the nonmigration household. Past
remittances also have led to more investments in capital goods, compared to the nonmigration
household.
Differences in factor endowments give rise to local village markets in land and capital.
Reflecting differences in factor endowments, the nonmigration household rents in land and
capital from the migration household. Labor is assumed to be a household nontradable: both
households produce the same crops and thus have identical peak-demands for labor, while the
isolated location of the village prevents short-term off-farm employment. In addition to a
subsistence crop (a household nontradable), both households produce two high-value cash
crops. One of these is a food crop, consumed by the household. The other is a nonfood crop
requiring further processing outside of the village, thus not consumed by the household.11
The SAM explicitly registers household consumption of output, and inputs used for
buying and selling transactions. The intersection of institution and activity accounts gives the
consumption of own output. The remainder of the production is sold outside the village,
involving transaction costs covered by the transacting activity. The transacting accounts also
registers the inputs required for purchasing external inputs and manufactured goods. Reflecting
different factor endowments, the nonmigration household is assumed to use less capital and
more labor for transactions compared to the migration household. For Model B, which does not
account for the use of inputs on the availability of production factors, the SAM is adjusted by
eliminating the inputs used for transactions from the SAM. This provides both model
specifications with the same starting point in terms of levels of production and marketed surplus.
Total transaction costs are initially the same for both households. The high-value nonfood
crop is assumed to be sold to a trader positioned about halfway between the village and the
town, thus having half the transaction cost of the other commodities. To reflect limited
substitution possibilities in agricultural production, all CES production functions are assumed to
have a substitution elasticity of 0.5.
Model Simulations: Food Crop Price-bands
Household responses to a stepwise increase in the price of the high-value nonfood crop are
simulated with the two village models to analyze how different transaction costs assumptions
affect household decisions. Results of the simulation are discussed in terms of participation in
the market for the high-value food crop, the only commodity both bought and sold by the
households. This focus on the high-value food crop allows an analysis of all trade regimes:
selling, self-sufficiency and buying. The supply response of the nonfood crop is the second focal
point of analyzing the differences between the two models. Nonfood supply response is strongly
affected by participation in the food crop market.12
Increasing the nonfood price reduces the attractiveness of the food crop as a source of
cash income. As a result households switch to production for own consumption, start
purchasing, and finally cease to produce the food crop. Changes in the price-band of the food
crop when the nonfood price is increased are shown in the upper part of figure 2 for Model A.
The change in price-band clearly differs between the households. For the nonmigration
household the price-bands initially narrows. Due to differences in production technology, the
shift from the food to the nonfood crop reduces the demand for labor and increases the demand
for capital. The nonmigration households uses more labor and less capital for transactions with
the outside world. For this household the decreasing labor price outweighs the increasing capital
price, thus reducing transaction costs. The migration household uses more capital, and as a result
the opposing changes in capital and labor prices cancel, leaving the price-band unchanged for the
first range of simulated nonfood price increases.
[insert figure 2: price-bands]
The nonmigration household does not participate in the food market at the start of the
simulation. The migration household switches to producing the food crop only for own
consumption when the nonfood price increases with 7.1 percent. This switch leads to a sudden
drop in the production of the food crop by the migration household, no longer providing a
market surplus. Increasing the nonfood price raises household income, thus increasing demand
for the food and the subsistence crop. The induced increase in food and (labor-intensive)
subsistence crop production raises the price of labor, while the increase in the capital price
continues. As a result the price-band of both households starts widening from the point where
the migration household enters its price-band.
The nonmigration household starts purchasing the food crop first, viz. when the price of
the nonfood crop has increased with 27.6 percent. This switch results in a drop in the production
of the food crop and an increase in nonfood production to pay for the purchased food crop.13
When the nonfood price increases with 31 percent, the nonmigration household ceases food
crop production, now completely relying on food purchases financed by nonfood crop
production. At this price increase the migration household still produces the food crop only for
own consumption. Through the local trade in land and capital its food crop shadow price is
affected by the trade-regime switches of the nonmigration household, as can be seen in figure 2.
These local interactions slow the increase in the shadow price of the food crop for the migration
household, thus postponing its switch to purchasing the food crop until the nonfood price
increases with 33.1 percent. After a nonfood price increases of 37.1 percent, the migration
households also specializes in the nonfood crop.
The general pattern in Model B is much the same as in Model A (see the lower part of
figure 2). However, ignoring the impact of transaction inputs on household and capital prices
causes both price-bands and switch points to differ somewhat. For the nonmigration household
differences between the two models are small. The range of nonfood prices for which the
migration household relies on its own food production is extended in Model B: it stops selling
earlier at price increase of 6.6 percent (7.1 percent in Model A), while starting purchasing the
food crop at a price increase of 35.2 percent (33.3 percent in Model A). Production stops at a
price increase of 39.0 percent (37.1 in Model A).
Absence of transaction inputs from the commodity balance in Model B leads to
differences in labor and capital prices. Differences in capital prices are minimal. Relative to the
total availability of capital in the village economy, limited amounts of capital are used for
transactions. Larger amounts of labor are used, and labor is a household nontradable. For the
migration household labor is a relatively scarce factor. Differences between the two models are
therefore more pronounced for this household. For example, when the nonfood price starts
increasing, the migration household shifts towards selling more of the nonfood crop, at the
expense of the food crop. Because the nonfood crop requires less transaction inputs, this shift14
reduces the demand for capital and labor. In Model A this reduction in demand for transaction
inputs slows the increase in the food crop price, and hence the point at which the household
stops selling the food crop. In Model B this impact on endogenous prices is not included,
therefore the migration household switches at a lower nonfood price increase. The difference in
labor prices, due to the impact on the commodity balances, also causes an increasing difference
in the width of the price-bands in Model A and B. This difference becomes visible in figure 2 at
the higher ranges of simulated nonfood price increases.
Model Simulations: Nonfood Crop Supply
Participation in the food market affects the own supply response of the nonfood crop. Figure 3a
shows the supply response of the nonmigration household, figure 3b of the migration
household. The migration household has a much higher supply response than the nonmigration
household, producing at least three times its base-level production. In contrast, the nonmigration
household reduces its production below base level for the major part of the simulation, only
increasing its production for a limited range of price increases. The initial reduction in nonfood
production by the nommigration household is due to the sharp production increase by the
migration household. Until ceasing to sell the food crop, the migration household has a supply
response of 32 percent. This increase in the nonfood production leads to a fast increase in the
capital price, and an increase in land prices as the nonmigration household rents capital and land
from the migration household. This increase in production costs outweighs the increase in
nonfood price, causing a reduction in the production of the nonfood crop by the nonmigration
household.
[insert figure 3: supply response]
When the migration household ceases selling the food crop, its shadow price of the food
crop starts increasing. This slows the switch towards the nonfood crop, reducing the supply15
responses of both households. The next change in supply response occurs when the
nonmigration household switches to purchasing the food crop. The required cash is earned by
increasing the production of the nonfood crop. The increase in nonfood production requires
capital, rented from the migration household. The migration household then reduces its
production of the nonfood crop, instead receiving income by renting out capital and land.
After the nonmigration household starts purchasing the food crop, every nonfood price
increase leads to a fast reduction in food crop production. This releases capital for nonfood
production, which thus keeps increasing. When food production comes to a halt, no more capital
becomes available and the supply response of the nonmigration household turns inelastic again.
When the migration household starts purchasing the food crop, it needs to increase its
nonfood production. This leads to a similar responses as for the initial price increases, including
the supply reduction by the nonmigration household. Production of the food crop by the
migration household is also phased out fast with subsequent price increases, releasing capital for
nonfood production. When production of the food crop by the migration household ceases,
supply becomes inelastic again for both households.
Model B shows a stronger supply response than Model A. More resources are available for
production since inputs used for transactions are not accounted for. In addition, effective prices
start diverging more and more when nonfood prices keep increasing. This leads to higher
effective nonfood price increases in Model B for the same increase in market nonfood market
prices. There are qualitative differences between the models during price-ranges with an inelastic
supply. When the nonfood price increases from 107 to 127, the supply response of the
nonmigration household in Model A is –2.4 percent, against 1.7 percent in Model B. In Model A
accounting for transaction use of capital leads to a slightly higher price of capital, yielding the
negative supply response. Similarly, in both other ranges of inelastic supply Model B has a
relatively more elastic supply response.16
Conclusions
The price-band model clarifies small or even counterintuitive household supply response when
transaction costs create a difference between market and effective household prices. Transaction
can costs also indirectly affect household response, however, by claiming scarce resources and
influencing endogenous prices. The model developed in this paper accounts for the direct effect
of transaction costs by including a price-band, and for the indirect effects by including inputs
used for transactions in the household commodity balance. Transaction costs become
household-specific if transaction inputs are household nontradables. The model in this paper
incorporates the impact of changes in traded volume on the price of transaction inputs, and thus
on the width of the price-band. Such price-effects result from transaction inputs being
nontradable at household or village level.
Simulations with two model specifications show the impact of accounting for indirect
effects of transaction costs. Two main findings of the simulations are that level of tradability
determines the size of the indirect effects, and that accounting for the indirect effects has no
clear-cut impact on household response.
The amount of transaction inputs relative to total endowments determines the size of the
indirect impact of transaction costs. Relevant total endowments are determined by the tradability
of transaction inputs. The difference between the two model specifications is mostly due to the
household nontradable transaction input, labor. For a household nontradable transaction input
the household endowment is relevant, where for a household tradable but village nontradable
input (capital) the larger total village endowment is relevant. Differences between the two model
specifications are therefore more pronounced for the migration household which has a relatively
small labor endowment.
Accounting for the indirect impact transaction costs has no clear-cut impact on household
response. On the one hand, changes in traded volume change the demand for transaction inputs.17
If tradability of transaction inputs is limited, price changes resulting from the change in demand
may widen or narrow the price-band, increasing or decreasing supply response. On the other
hand, supply response reduces when accounting for the use of transaction inputs with limited
tradability, because selling more output reduces the amount of production factors available for
increasing production.
Indirect effects of transaction costs can change the expected household supply response
from positive to negative, and from elastic to inelastic, highlighting the importance of quantifying
transaction costs beyond their monetary impact on effective household prices. The level of
tradability of transaction inputs plays a key role in determining their indirect effect on household
response. Identification of the tradability of commodities used for transactions is thus needed to
account for indirect impacts of transaction costs through competition with production activities,
and through changes in price formation.
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Transaction costs of purchasing
Transaction costs of sellingTable 1: A Micro Economywide Model with Endogenous Transaction Costs and Endogenous Trade Regimes
Model structure
# Sets, parameters, variables
Household model (equations hold for all  h ∈∈∈∈  H)
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Village trade balances












































   p ~ Household shadow prices
q Quantities
w Household income
# Subscripts indicate type of commodity and/or household; superscripts denote the way in which the commodity is used.







o q q k q k q
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ κ γ γ
/ 1 / 1 / 1 ] [ ] [ ] [ , where κ i combines the distribution parameter (γ i) and efficiency parameter (k) of input i.Table 2: A Stylized SAM of an Isolated Rural Village economy
Activities Commodities Factors Households ROW
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (F1) (F2) (F3) (H1) (H2) (R)
Activities (A1) Subsistence crop, nonmigration hh. 4.0
(A2) High-value food crop, nonmigration hh. 4.5
(A3) High-value nonfood crop, nonmigration hh. 14.4
(A4) Transacting, nonmigration hh. 0.6 0.6 0.7
(A5) Subsistence crop, migration hh. 2.0
(A6) High-value food crop, migration hh. 6.9 3.0
(A7) High-value nonfood crop, migration hh. 4.3
(A8) Transacting, migration hh. 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.2
Commodities (C1) Subsistence crop
(C2) High-value food crop 7.6
(C3) High-value nonfood crop 19.5
(C4) External inputs 1.5 4.8 3.3 1.4
(C5) Manufactured good 7.3 13.6
Factors (F1) Labor 3.0 1.5 2.4 1.5 1.5 3.3 0.7 1.6 0.3 0.2
(F2) Land 0.5 0.8 2.4 0.3 1.7 0.7
(F3) Capital 0.5 0.8 4.8 0.3 0.3 1.7 1.4 0.8
Households (H1) Nonmigration household 8.7 3.0 4.4
(H2) Migration household 7.3 3.3 6.2 2.0
Rest of world (R) External trade 10.0 19.0
Totals 4.0 4.5 14.4 1.9 2.0 10.0 4.3 2.5 0.0 7.6 19.5 11.0 20.9 15.9 6.3 10.6 16.0 18.8 29.0 Figure 2: Food Crop Price-bands of Nonmigration and Migration Households in Model A and in Model B (% change from base)
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Sale price food crop
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Nonmigration Household Migration HouseholdFigure 3a: Nonfood Supply Response for the Nonmigration Household (% change from base)
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